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THE MATHEMATICS OF APPORTIONMENT
EFTON PARKt
An important aspect of any representative democracy is the manner in
which its legislative bodies are chosen. This process involves many
components, and a fundamental question is this: how does one fairly apportion
representatives in a legislature? A priori, this seems to be a question that is
easily answered, but in fact apportionment is a complicated problem, both
mathematically and politically. The Founding Fathers recognized both the
importance and difficulty of the apportionment problem, and several of them,
including Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, proposed apportionment
methods. George Washington exercised the first presidential veto in history by
rejecting Hamilton's method of apportionment.
In this Article, I will discuss the various methods of apportionment that
have been used in the U.S. House of Representatives, and I will particularly
focus on the unusual mathematical problems and paradoxes that arise in
apportionment. These problems are more than just an academic curiosity-the
legitimacy of apportionment is based primarily on the perception (of both
Congress and the voting public) that the apportionment method in use is fair.
However, as we shall see, every method of apportionment has particular flaws
and biases. Also, the issue of what constitutes a "fair" apportionment method is
quite debatable. For these reasons and others, apportionment has been a very
contentious issue at many times during the history of the United States.
This Article will discuss some of the many interesting aspects of
apportionment, and I will illustrate the features and drawbacks of various
apportionment methods by considering some specific numerical examples. For
more information on both the history and mathematics of apportionment, the
reader is urged to consult the excellent monograph on this subject written by
Balinski and Young.2
t Efton Park is Associate Professor of Mathematics at Texas Christian University. He thanks Professor
Elizabeth Garrett and the editors for their helpful comments.
1. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 32 The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript
Sources, 1745-1799 16-7 (Government Printing Office 1931-1944).
2. M.L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair Representation (Yale 1982).
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THE APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM
Let us begin by precisely stating the problem.
Given states s,, . ., s. and a house of size h, choose whole numbers a,, a2.  a so
that a,+ a2,+ + a.= h.
For each state sk, the number a, is its apportionment. In most cases, there
are additional restrictions placed on the apportionments. For example, if we
wish to apportion the U.S. House of Representatives, we are bound by Article
I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution: "The Number of Representatives shall
not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one
Representative." In addition, it is desirable that a state's apportionment be
roughly proportional to the population of the state. To put this in
mathematical terms, let p,, p2 . . .. , p be the populations of the states s,, S2' ....
s, respectively, and let p = p1 + P2 + "' + p, be the total population. Then for
each state sk, its quota qk is the number pkh/p. Ideally, each state's
apportionment should be equal to its quota. The problem is that the quota is
almost always a number with a fractional part, whereas most legislative bodies
do not allow fractional numbers of representatives. Therefore, we need a
method of rounding the quotas to whole numbers. As we shall see, this
ostensibly simple rounding issue is in reality quite problematic.
METHODS OF APPORTIONMENT
There are many methods of apportionment that have been suggested (and
in fact, there are an infinite number of different apportionment methods). In
this Article, I consider the following methods: Jefferson's method, attributable
to Thomas Jefferson and used from 1791 until 1830; Webster's method,
devised by Daniel Webster and used in the 1840, 1910, and 1930
apportionments; Hill's method, attributable to Joseph A. Hill', used from 1940
to present; and Hamilton's method, proposed by Alexander Hamilton, used
from 1850 to 1900.' A fifth method, that of John Quincy Adams, was
considered by Congress but never adopted.
3. Hill was a statistician with the U.S. Census Bureau. This method is sometimes called the
Huntington method or the Huntington-Hill method, for Edward V. Huntington, professor of mechanics
and mathematics at Harvard. Huntington was a classmate of Hill's when both were students at Harvard and
was an influential proponent of the method. See Balinski and Young, Fair Representation at 50 (cited in note
2).
4. The observant reader will notice that the apportionment method for the 1920 census data is not
present. This is because the apportionment debate in Congress was so divisive throughout the 1920's that
Congress never agreed on an apportionment method, so the U.S. House was not reapportioned until after
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All of these apportionment schemes, except for Hamilton's, are examples
of divisor methods.
General Divisor Method. Choose the house size h, and find a number d, called a
divisor, so that rnd(p,/d) + rnd(p,/d) + . . . + rnd(p/d) = h, where "rnd" is some
rounding rule. Then for each state sk, its apportionment is rnd(pjd).
Note that such a divisor d can always be chosen, because the left hand side of
the equation can be made arbitrarily large or small by making d smaller or
larger, respectively. Also observe that typically there is not a unique value for d;
usually there is a range of values that will work. However, all divisors that yield
a given house size will produce the same apportionment.
Tables 1 and 2 describe the various rounding rules and the divisor methods
associated with them.
Table 1: Rounding Rules
Name Description Examples
floor(x) nearest whole number less than or floor(2.2) = 2
equal to x floor(7.9) = 7
ceiling(x) nearest whole number greater than ceiling(2.2) = 3
or equal to x ceiling(7.9) = 8
near(x) whole number nearest to x near(2.2) = 2
near(7.9) = 8
gmr(x) round up or down according to the geometric mean of 2 and 3 is approx.
whether x is greater than or less 2.449, so for example
than the geometric mean of floor(x) gmr(2.44) = 2
and ceiling(x), respectively (the gmr(2.45) = 3D
geometric mean of two numbers is
the square root of their product).
Table 2: Divisor Methods
Name of Method Rounding Rule
Jefferson floor
the 1930 census had been taken. For more information, see Balinski and Young, Fair Representation at 53
(cited in note 2).
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Adams
Webster
ceiling
near
Finally, we define Hamilton's method.
Hamilton's Method. Choose the house size h, compute the quotas q,, q,. q., and
for each state sk, assign it floor(q,) seats. Then distribute the remaining seats to those
states for which the fractional part of their quota is the largest.
To better understand these apportionment methods, it is instructive to
examine an example involving a fictitious country with eight states.
Table 3: A Comparison of the Apportionment Methods
State Population Quota Jefferson Adams Webster Hill Hamilton
State A 1,908,578 40.705 42 39 41 40 41
State B 1,366,072 29.135 30 28 29 29 29
State C 651,832 13.902 14 14 14 14 14
State D 250,657 5.346 5 6 5 5 5
State E 163,904 3.496 3 4 4 4 3
State F 157,147 3.352 3 4 3 3 3
State G 120,419 2.568 2 3 3 3 3
State H 70,173 1.497 1 2 1 2 2
Total 4,688,782 100 100 100 100 100 100
Divisor5 44,600 49,000 46,800 47,300
Note that each of the methods gives a different apportionment in this example,
so these five methods are truly distinct.
Observe that State A's quota is 40.705. In the interest of fairness, it would
seem that State A should receive either forty or forty-one representatives.
However, Jefferson's method assigns State A forty-two representatives, while
Adams' method assigns only thirty-nine representatives to State A. These are
examples of violation of quota; by definition, violation of quota occurs
whenever a state's apportionment differs from its quota by more than one seat.
5. The divisors are computed by trial and error; there are no formulas for them.
[7:227
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Violation of quota is very likely to occur with either Jefferson's or Adams'
method and somewhat less likely with Webster's or Hill's method, but can
occur in any divisor method; I will have more to say about this later. Quota
violation can never occur with Hamilton's method, but as we shall see in the
next section, Hamilton's method suffers from other problems.
The data in Table 3 may lead one to suspect that Jefferson's method favors
states with large populations6, while Adams' method favors the small states; this
is generally true. Hill's method also favors small states, but not to the extent
that Adams' method does. On the other hand, Hamilton's method has a slight
bias toward large states.7 Finally, Webster's method generally treats large and
small states equally s Now, an examination of Table 3 shows that Hamilton's
method assigns two representatives to State H, while Webster's method assigns
only one representative to that state. This seems to contradict the assertion that
Hamilton's method favors large states. However, to say that an apportionment
method is biased toward large states (for example) means that over many
elections, the method systematically favors those states; the results of any one
apportionment are not sufficient to show bias.
APPORTIONMENT PARADOXES
The violation of quota problem that arises in divisor methods is certainly
undesirable. However, far stranger things can occur in seemingly reasonable
apportionment methods. Of these, perhaps the strangest is the Alabama
paradox, whose namesake was almost its victim after the 1880 census.9 I
demonstrate the paradox by considering State H from Table 3 and examining
its apportionment under Hamilton's method as the size of the house increases:
Table 4: Apportionment for State H
under Hamilton's Method
House Size 100 105 107 108 111 113 115
Apportionment 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Table 4 demonstrates that it is possible under Hamilton's method for a state's
apportionment to decrease when the house size increases, and in fact this can
happen multiple times. The state of Maine was adversely affected in this way
6. I will leave it to the reader to ponder the significance of the fact that Jefferson was from Virginia,
and that at the time Jefferson proposed his method, Virginia was the most populous state in the union.
7. Balinski and Young, Fair Representation at 83.
8. Id at 76.
9. Congressional Record, 47th Congress, Ist Sess (1881) vol 12, pp 704-705.
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after the 1900 census, prompting Maine representative John E. Littlefield to
declare, "God help the State of Maine when mathematics reach for her and
undertake to strike her down.""0 This bizarre phenomenon often occurs in
Hamilton's method, and is largely responsible for the abandonment of the
method by the U.S. Congress at the turn of the century. Another problem with
Hamilton's method is the population paradox, in which a state that is growing
quickly loses representatives to a state that is growing more slowly. Divisor
methods avoid both the Alabama and population paradoxes, and are the only
apportionment methods for which the population paradox never occurs."
An additional paradox from which Hamilton's method suffers is the new
states paradox. As the name suggests, this paradox arises when new states are
added. For example, suppose a territory with a population of 604,642 is
admitted to our fictitious country and becomes State J. Currently each
representative has 4,688,782/100 46,888 constituents, so State J should
receive an apportionment of 604,642/46,888 - 13 seats. Therefore, thirteen
seats are added to the legislature, and one might expect that the
apportionments of the other states remain the same. However, Table 5 shows
that this is not the case.
Table 5: New States Paradox under Hamilton's Method
State Population Apportionment Population Apportionment
State E 163,904 3 163,904 4
State H 70,173 2 70,173 1
State J - - 604,642 13
Total 4,688,782 100 5,293,424 113
As in the case of the Alabama and population paradoxes, the new states
paradox does not occur with the use of any of the divisor methods.'2
All of the paradoxes I have discussed appear when Hamilton's method is
used, but divisor methods also admit paradoxes. One example is the migration
paradox,'3 an example of which is given in Table 6.
10. Reapportionment Act H 12740, 56th Cong 2d Sess Uan 5, 1901), in 34 Cong Rec H 593 (1901).
11. Balinski and Young, Fair Representation at 70 (cited in nite 2).
12. Id.
13. B.A. Bradberry, A Geometric View of Some Apportionment Paradoxes, 65 Mathematics Magazine 1,
16 (1992).
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Table 6: Migration Paradox under Hill's Method
State Population Apportionment Population Apportionment
State A 1,908,578 40 1,908,578 41
State C 651,832 14 300,832 6
State G 120,419 3 471,419 10
Total 4,688,782 100 4,688,782 100
In Table 6, 351,000 people have migrated from State C to State G, while the
populations of the other six states remain fixed. Of course, this migration
affects the apportionments of States C and G, but observe that State A also
gains a representative. The migration paradox is not just a defect of Hill's
method; it can occur with the use of any apportionment method, including
Hamilton's method.
WHAT APPORTIONMENT METHOD SHOULD WE USE?
As we have seen, each of the various methods that have been used to
apportion the U. S. House of Representatives has unpleasant political and
mathematical consequences. A natural question arises: is there an
apportionment method that avoids these paradoxes? At the very least, it would
be desirable to have a method that satisfies the following axioms:
Axioms for an Apportionment Method
1. Population Monotonicity: No state that gains population gives up a seat to one that
loses population.
2. House Monotonicity: If each state's population remains fixed and the house size
increases, then no state loses a seat.
3. Quota: No state's apportionment deviates from its quota by more than one seat.
These axioms appear quite minimal, and there are surely others that one could
add to this list. However, the foregoing axioms are sufficient to cause problems;
Balinski and Young proved that there exists no apportionment method
satisfying these three axioms simultaneously. In fact, more is true-we cannot
even find an apportionment method that is population monotone and does not
2000]
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violate quota. 4 Therefore, we must be resigned to the fact that whatever
apportionment method we choose, it will suffer from at least some of the
paradoxes I have described.
There does not exist a perfect apportionment method, but what is the best
apportionment method? To answer this question, it is necessary to define what
"best" means. Certainly the method should be fair, but the meaning of "fair" in
this context is subject to interpretation. For example, one might argue that an
apportionment method is fair if it favors neither the large states nor the small
states. On the other hand, since the composition of the U.S. Senate favors
small states, it is not unreasonable to utilize an apportionment method such as
Jefferson's, which would favor the large states in the U.S. House. Historically,
most Representatives have sought apportionment methods that treat large and
small states equally.
The problem of finding the best apportionment method has been a subject
of intense debate for much of the history of the United States, and in the first
part of the twentieth century, two groups of mathematicians weighed in with
their opinions. In 1929, four prominent mathematicians who were members of
the National Academy of Sciences wrote a report that favored Hill's method."
Largely on the basis of this report, Congress permanently adopted Hill's
method in 1941.6 In 1948, the eminent mathematicians Marston Morse, John
von Neumann, and Luther Eisenhart were asked to examine the apportionment
problem, and they concurred with the 1929 report.1
7
In spite of the impressive list of proponents of Hill's method, the reasoning
used by these mathematicians was sophistic at best. The mathematicians who
wrote the 1929 report considered only five divisor methods, which they called
the method of smallest divisors (Adams' method), the method of greatest
divisors (Jefferson's method), the method of major fractions (Webster's
method), the method of equal proportions (Hill's method), and the method of
the harmonic mean (Dean's method, s which was never seriously considered for
adoption). The methods were ranked in order of the extent to which they
14. M.L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, The Apportionment of Representation, 33 Proceedings of
Symposia in Applied Mathematics 1, 25 (1985).
15. G.A. Bliss, E.W. Brown, L.P. Eisenhart, R. Pearl, Report to the President of the NationalAcademy of
Sciences 21-3 (1929).
16. The Congress 2 USC §2a (1941); US Statutes at Large, 1941-42, vol 55, part 1, pp 761-762.
17. M. Morse, J.v. Neumann, L. Eisenhart, "Report to the President of the National Academy of
Sciences" (May 28, 1948), mimeograph.
18. James Dean was professor of astronomy and mathematics at Dartmouth and the University of
Vermont. The rounding rule that he suggested was to round up or down according to whether a state's
quota was greater or less, respectively, than the harmonic mean of the floor and ceiling of the quota. The
harmonic mean of two numbers is 2 divided by the sum of the reciprocals of the numbers. For more
information, see Balinski and Young, Fair Representation at 29.
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favored small states over large states, which put Hill's method in the middle.
On the basis of this reasoning, the four mathematicians decreed that Hill's
method must be the one that is unbiased. This reasoning is rather fatuous,
since there are an infinite number of divisor methods, not just five. Certainly
these mathematicians were capable of a more penetrating mathematical analysis
of the problem than this; it seems that they did not take the problem very
seriously. The 1948 report largely echoes the 1929 report (Eisenhart was one of
the four who contributed to the 1929 report), so it appears that Morse, von
Neumann, and Eisenhart also failed to give serious consideration to the
problem.
Starting in the 1970's, several researchers began a careful mathematical
study of apportionment methods, and Balinski and Young proved that among
the apportionment methods we have considered in this Article, only Webster's
method is free of bias. 9 Moreover, Webster's method, like all divisor methods,
is both population monotone and house monotone. It is possible for Webster's
method to violate quota, but it is the divisor method that is least likely to do
so. Finally, Webster's method is the only divisor method that satisfies nearness
of quota; an apportionment is near quota if it is not possible to transfer a seat
from one state to another and bring both states closer to their quotas." One
can also argue that the rounding algorithm that Webster's method uses
(rounding to the nearest whole number) intuitively seems the fairest. As
Representative John A. Anderson put it in 1882,
Since the world began there has been but one way of proportioning numbers,
namely, by using a common divisor, by running the "remainders" into decimals, by
taking fractions above .5, and dropping those below .5; nor can there be any other
method. This process is purely arithmetical ... If a hundred men were being torn
from limb to limb, or a thousand babies being crushed, this process would have no
more feeling in the matter than would an iceberg; because the science of mathematics
has no more bowels of mercy than has a cast-iron dog.2'
EPILOGUE: HILL VS. WEBSTER
As the foregoing examples suggest, there exists no perfect method of
apportionment. Every method that has ever been used or will be used has at
19. Balinski and Young, TheApportionment ofRepresentation at 1-29 (cited in note 14). There are other
divisor methods that are unbiased, but they involve bizarre rounding rules that are politically and
aesthetically unpalatable; see id at 20.
20. Fair Representation at 82 (cited in note 2).
21. Apportionment of Representatives, H 3550, 47th Cong, 1st Sess (February 15, 1882), in 13 Cong
Rec H 1179 (1882).
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least one drawback that makes it politically and mathematically distasteful.
Webster's method is the closest to being flawless, but it seems unlikely (at least
for the foreseeable future) that Congress will reconsider its decision to use
Hill's method. Nonetheless, there is a compelling argument that Webster's
method is significantly superior to Hill's method.
As I mentioned above, Webster's method can violate quota, but it does so
very rarely. A violation of quota occurs with Webster's method approximately
once every 1640 apportionments, or 16,400 years.22 Furthermore, if Webster's
method had been used to apportion every session of the House of
Representatives since 1792, not a single quota violation would have occurred.'
Hill's method is also unlikely to violate quota; a quota violation in Hill's
method should be expected only once every 3500 years. 24 Thus, quota
violations are quite rare in either one of these apportionment methods, and if
quota violation were the only issue, there would not be a compelling reason for
switching from Hill's method to Webster's method.
The more serious drawback to Hill's method is that it is biased toward
states with small populations. If one were to look at a large number of
apportionments using Hill's method, one would find that per capita, small
states average 3.5% more representatives than do large states.25 There already
exists a bias toward small states in the House, since every state, no matter how
meagerly populated, is granted at least one representative. In addition, as I
mentioned earlier, the Senate is also biased toward small states. All of these
facts support Webster's method over Hill's.
Another advantage that Webster's method enjoys is that it tends to keep
states' apportionments closer to their quotas than does Hill's method. For
example, if Webster's method had been used to apportion the House following
the 1920 census, six more states' apportionments would have been closer to
quota than would have been the case with Hill's method."
The final benefit of Webster's method that I mention here is its simplicity.
The idea of rounding to the nearest whole number is easy to explain and easy
to understand. In contrast, the "geometric mean ratio" rounding rule that
Hill's method employs seems quite unnatural and is somewhat difficult to
understand, especially to those who are not mathematicians. It would be
interesting to poll the House of Representatives on this subject; I conjecture
few Representatives even know that Hill's method is the current method of
22. Fair Representation at 81 (cited in note 2).
23. Id at 82.
24. Idat 81.
25. Id at 77.
26. Id at 82.
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apportionment, and I surmise that almost no one in the House could explain
the details of the method. However, until some state decides that it is being
unfairly treated, Hill's method will probably remain the law of the land.

